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FREE SPEECH, FAKE NEWS, AND
DEMOCRACY
Alvin I. Goldman & Daniel Baker*
I. PROTECTING FREE SPEECH VERSUS PROTECTING
DEMOCRACY
It is widely assumed that freedom of speech is an essential
feature of democracy.1 In the American Constitutional system,
the First Amendment expresses a fundamental protection that
must be honored and applied if democracy is to be maintained
as the most legitimate and justifiable form of government.2 As
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1
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA: A HISTORY 1 (2008). See also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26–27 (1948).
2
“Indeed, the votes and statements of the Justices in Guarnieri indicate that
all of the current Justices accept the basic premise that the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause is preeminently concerned with the
democratic process, and that speech relevant to self-governance receives
greater protection than other forms of speech.” Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details:
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emphasized in Garrison v. Louisiana, “speech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of selfgovernment.”3 Free speech and the accompanying protections of
the media in the First Amendment allow citizens to inform
themselves and deliberate about policy in a way that gives selfgovernment its meaning and its effectiveness.
This is the relatively simple and basic story that students
are taught as part of their primer on American government. And
since freedom of speech is also hailed as a fundamental human
right––embraced by a wide range of nations across the world––
its centrality and significance are hard to overstate.

4

In

application however, matters are not so simple.

Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 35 (2012) (citing
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379 (2011)).
3
379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964).
4
See G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19
(Dec. 10, 1948); G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, (Dec. 16, 1966); European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. X, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953); American
Convention on Human Rights, art. XIII, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S No. 36,
at 1, OEA/Ser. LJV/ 11.23 Doc. Rev. 2 (entered into force July 18, 1978);
African [Banjul] Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, art. IX, June 26,
1981, OAU Doc. CAB/ LEG/67/3/Rev.5.

68

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

Freedom of speech involves tradeoffs to weigh its value
against the harms that speech can cause, and no country resolves
these tradeoffs entirely in favor of protecting speech.5 Even
among advanced democracies that have agreed to treat speech as
a fundamental right, there is significant disagreement about
resolving these tradeoffs.6 At the same time, what makes a
democratic government more or less successful is itself a thorny
and actively debated issue.
Recently, these debates have coalesced around the spread
of “fake news”—false claims that have seemed to many
commentators to undermine the effectiveness and value of
democratic elections by flooding the environment with

5

See Tom Ginsburg, Freedom of Expression Abroad: The State of Play, in THE
FREE SPEECH CENTURY 193 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone ed.,
2019).
6
For example, consider the differing ways that tradeoffs are resolved in the
regulation of hate speech. Stephanie Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The
Historical and Theoretical Foundations of International Law Concerning Hate
Speech, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 11–12 (1996) (citing Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 5, Articles 7, 29) (“the right to
freedom of expression is subject to the restrictions found in the general
limiting clause, Article 29, as well as in Article 7, which prohibits incitement
to discrimination”). For the U.S. interpretation, see Snyder v. Phelps, 562
U.S. 443 (2011). For the European interpretations, see ARTICLE 19,
Responding to “Hate Speech”: Comparative Overview of Six EU Countries
(2018).
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disinformation.7 For example, a poll by the Pew Research Center
between February 19 and March 4, 2019 found that “made-up
news” was identified by more Americans than terrorism, illegal
immigration, racism, and sexism as “a very big problem in the
country today.”8
A recent New York Times op-ed, “Facebook Wins,
Democracy Loses,” detailed the events of the 2016 American
presidential election and reflected on its ramifications for
democracy.9 Siva Vaidhyanathan describes it as follows:
On Wednesday, Facebook revealed that hundreds
of Russia-based accounts had run anti-Hillary
Clinton ads precisely aimed at Facebook users
whose demographic profiles implied a
vulnerability to political propaganda…. The ads
… were what the advertising industry calls “dark
posts,” seen only by a very specific audience,
7

The Oxford English Dictionary defines disinformation as, “The dissemination
of deliberatively false information, esp. when supplied by a government or
its agent to a foreign power or to the media, with the intention of influencing
the policies or opinions of those who receive it; false information so
supplied.” “Disinformation, n.,” OED Online (2019) (last visited Sept. 26,
2019).
8
Amy Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried, Galen Stocking, Mason Walker & Sophia
Fedeli, Many Americans Say Made-Up News is a Critical Problem that Needs To
Be Fixed, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 2019),
https://www.journalism.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/8/2019/06/PJ_2019.06.05_Misinformation_FINAL
-1.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).
9
Siva Vaidhyanathan, Facebook Wins, Democracy Loses, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/opinion/facebook-winsdemocracy-loses.html.
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obscured by the flow of posts within a Facebook
News Feed and ephemeral….
The potential for abuse is vast. An ad could falsely
accuse a candidate of the worst malfeasance a day
before Election Day, and the victim would have
no way of even knowing it happened. Ads could
stoke ethnic hatred and no one could prepare or
respond before serious harm occurs….
Unfortunately, the range of potential responses to
this problem is limited. The First Amendment
grants broad protections to publishers like
Facebook….10
The author then draws the following “strong” conclusion about
the impact of these practices on democracy: “We are in the midst
of a worldwide, internet-based assault on democracy . . . In the
twenty-first century social media information war, faith in
democracy is the first casualty.”11
Vaidhyanathan

claims

that

the

spread

of

false

information produced an “assault” on democracy.12 But exactly
what notion of democracy underlies this claim? Before agreeing
with his conclusion, we should ask for more details. How exactly
is democracy assaulted? If there are such assaults, how do they
relate to democratic goals? Finally, how exactly is free speech

10

Id.
Id. (italics added).
12
Id.
11
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implicated in this “assault”? Does this assault indicate that
speech protections are overly broad?
In another op-ed contribution to the New York Times,
Zeynep Tufekci presented an additional example that may be
helpful to begin answering these questions.13 Tufekci describes a
similar case in which a Facebook post featured outrageous
claims about Hillary Clinton, such as the claim that Clinton had
FBI agents murdered.14 Let us assume that this egregious
falsehood was posted at the behest of the Trump campaign,
making it false speech during a campaign. Then let us imagine a
new character, Arnold, and add further details to the story for
purposes of illustration. Let Arnold be an American voter who
read this post about Clinton’s murders, believed the tale, and
then concluded that Clinton would be a terrible president. Thus,
Arnold changed his mind and voted for Donald Trump rather
than Clinton.

13

Zeynep Tufecki, Zuckerberg’s Preposterous Defense of Facebook, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/29/opinion/markzuckerberg-facebook.html.
14
Id.
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Our case is one in which a falsehood is “told” to Arnold
(among numerous others) by a campaign operative, and this
falsehood influences his vote. How should a democratic
government approach this kind of case? On the one hand, the
traditional story described above, which emphasizes the
importance of free speech for democracy, would seem to count
against regulation of these false claims. On the other hand, these
commentators seem to question that presumption and call for
regulative action.15 Two categories of action might be
contemplated: One consists of attempts to eliminate or reduce
these kinds of postings, especially on platforms with a
multitudinous readership. A second would take punitive action
against some actor(s)––either against the campaign purchaser of
the Facebook ad or Facebook itself. In other words, action might
be taken against one or both of these actors for creating and/or
distributing “fake news.” Assuming there is sufficient evidence
to show that these events actually transpired, should the
government make a criminal or civil case of it? Should there be

15

By focusing on public, regulative action, we set aside questions of
defamation, which would address whether Clinton or other parties could
bring a private action against the Trump Campaign.
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statutes that enable the state to take punitive action against false
campaign speech in the (hypothetical) case in question?
Anyone who sides with regulation must concede that the
First Amendment jurisprudence has been very resistant to the
idea that the mere falsity of a conveyed message is grounds for
taking action against a speaker. To take a few examples, in United
States v. Alvarez,16 the Court was careful to instruct that “falsity
alone may not suffice to bring speech outside the First
Amendment.”17

Similarly,

anything

recognizable

as

a

conception of freedom of speech must entail a requirement that
government, in its capacity as potential regulator, maintain a
stance of evaluative neutrality vis-à-vis messages. As Justice
Jackson expressed the point, “[i]f there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in matters of opinion . . . .
”18

16

567 U.S. 709 (2012).
Id.at 709.
18
W. Va., State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
17
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Under a broad interpretation of this doctrine, a message
to Facebook users that falsely asserts that Hillary Clinton
murdered FBI agents is not grounds for legal action. As Harry
Kalven, an esteemed legal theorist of his era, wrote: “the state is
not to umpire the truth or falsity of doctrine; it is to remain
neutral.”19 Under this view, freedom of speech protects speakers’
rights to speak as they please, regardless of the truth or falsity of
the message. People are not to be constrained from saying what
they would like to say, i.e. from expressing their thoughts or
opinions. In the present case, presumably, this interpretation
implies that statutes are not legitimate (and must therefore be
declared unconstitutional) when they seek to constrain based on
content what speakers may say or may post in a public forum,
such as Facebook. In other words, under this interpretation, the
state may not determine whether particular assertions are true or
false or take action against speakers who make false assertions.
The

statements

asserted

or

conveyed

by

these

hypothetical speakers are examples of what nowadays is called

19

HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
AMERICA 10 (1988).
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“fake news.”20 There is no consensus about exactly what is
meant by this expression, though.21 At a minimum, a working
definition should take fake news to refer to false statements made
by people who do not actually believe what they assert, who may
even actively disbelieve those statements. Thus, they are
characteristically assertions intended to be disinformation rather
than genuine, or truthful, information. Is it appropriate for the
First Amendment to preclude government from regulating the
activity in question? That is, is it appropriate (within a
democracy) for courts of law to protect the rights of speakers to
intentionally engage in the spreading of fake news, as illustrated
in our examples? If we assume that speakers are always within
their First Amendment rights to say what is false, or say what

20

For a background on fake news, its production and recent trends, see Hunt
Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016
Election, 31 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 211, 213–17 (2017).
21
Edson C. Tandoc Jr., Zheng Wei Lim & Richard Ling, Defining “Fake
News,” 6 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 137, 147 (2018). Several prominent
definitions have been offered recently. Hunt Alcott and Matthew Gentzkow
“define ‘fake news’ to be news articles that are intentionally and verifiably
false, and could mislead readers.” Hunt Alcott and Matthew Gentzkow,
Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 211, 213
(2017). David Lazar, et al., define fake news as “fabricated information that
mimics news media content in form but not in organizational process or
intent.” David M. J. Lazar, et al., The Science of Fake News: Addressing Fake
News Requires a Multidisciplinary Effort, 359 SCI. 1094 (2018).
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they believe to be false, it looks as though the constitutional
protection of freedom of speech will exclude the creation and
enforcement of government-based remedies against fake news of
the kind we have just sketched.
Now, some citizens might be content with this upshot, or
at least willing to accept it. Freedom of speech is so vital a
component of democracy, they might say, that we should simply
accept this consequence and live with it. The articles cited above
indicate growing resistance to the idea that fake news is simply
an unfortunate side effect to a consensus understanding of
democratic free speech. In this article, we will focus on one
element of this debate: regulation of false campaign speech.
While the constitutionality of such statutes is unclear,
currently more than a dozen states have statutes prohibiting
some form of false campaign speech.22 For example, Wisconsin’s

22

Staci Lieffring, First Amendment and the Right to Lie: Regulating Knowingly
False Campaign Speech After United States v. Alvarez, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1047,
1056 (2013). See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.095(A) (2010); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 1-13-109 (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.271 (WEST 2008); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 18:1463(C) (2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-875 (2007); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 163-274(A)(8) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04 (2007); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 260.532 (WEST 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-13-16
(SUPP. 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-142 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. §
20A-11-1103 (WEST 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17A.335 (WEST
2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-11 (WEST 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 12.05
(WEST 2004).
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statute asserts, “No person may knowingly make or publish, or
cause to be made or published, a false representation pertaining
to a candidate or referendum which is intended or tends to affect
voting at an election.”23
False campaign speech is precisely a category into which
fake news examples seem to fall when the speaker is directed by
a campaign. The fact that so many states have passed statutes
prohibiting false campaign speech lends further support to the
notion that voters or representatives are concerned about the
issue of fake news and were supportive of some regulation of
false electoral assertions to protect the integrity of elections.
Obviously, this kind of regulation departs from a simple,
unqualified interpretation of the First Amendment, which would
prohibit regulation of any speech in the public forum.24 Affirming
these statutes would assert that some speech in the public forum

23

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 12.05 (2018).
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating that
the First Amendment reflects “a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open”).
24
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imposes harm worthy of government action, even when weighed
against the value of free speech in a democracy.
Of course, the Court need not concur with the proregulation policy vis-à-vis false campaign speech implied by
these state statutes. It is distinctly possible that the Court would
overturn some or all of these statutes if it reached that test.25 For
the moment, however, we are not interested in what the Supreme
Court––or circuit courts––have decided or are likely to decide.
Such questions will be addressed in Section IV. For now, it is
sufficient to note that the existence of these statutes indicates a
strong desire to consider regulation of fake news.
It is well past time to consider whether government
regulation of false electoral speech or fake news can fit a
justifiable interpretation of the First Amendment. That is, setting
aside the prediction of whether the Court would in fact find these
statutes constitutional, we ask whether they ought to be
constitutional. No interpreters of the First Amendment contend

25

In fact, both Washington’s and Minnesota’s bans on false campaign
speech were struck down by state and federal courts of appeals, respectively.
Rickert v. State, Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 827 (Wash. 2007);
Wash. ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d
691, 693 (Wash. 1998); 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 635 (8th
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 2012 WL 2470100 (June 29, 2012).
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that freedom of speech is guaranteed across the board, for all
categories of speech, in all circumstances. That unqualified, or
“purist,” interpretation has never been endorsed by the Supreme
Court.26 Although the First Amendment says “Congress shall
make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .,”27 this
does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without
responsibility, whatever one may choose, nor does it give people
full protection for everything they say.28 In particular, there are
exceptions for a few well-defined and narrowly limited
categories of speech that allow for lesser protection against
content regulation29 including obscenity,30 fighting words,31 child
pornography,32 and defamation.33 In short, the Court allows
exceptions to the general principle of free speech. This exception
should be extended to fake news and other campaign falsehoods.

26

STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 463 (2008).
27
U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
28
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
29
See Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 207, 214
(1993).
30
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
31
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 565, 571-72 (1942).
32
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760-61 (1982).
33
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
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In considering these matters, we might profitably reflect
on examples of speech policy in other domains. In a recent
article, Jeffrey Howard provides an instructive example
concerning speech that advocates criminal conduct.34 Howard
reminds us that the U.S. Supreme Court insists that such speech
should be protected, not suppressed or regulated.35 In the case of
Brandenburg v Ohio, the Court affirmed sweeping protection for
such speech.36 Except for emergency cases in which the speech
will cause imminent harm, it must be protected. The upshot,
under this ruling, is to protect criminal actions that many people
would intuitively consider highly worthy of punitive action.37
Here are two (actual) examples that Howard considers.
In 2015, a husband and wife in San Bernardino, California, shot
and killed fourteen people. They were apparently inspired by
exposure to the extreme cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, whose
YouTube video advocated the duty to kill Americans. Under
American law, al-Awlaki could not be convicted for his speech

34

Jeffrey W. Howard, Dangerous Speech, 47 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208 (2019).
Id. at 209.
36
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
37
Howard, supra n. 35, at 209.
35
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(which Howard labels “dangerous speech”).38

Similarly, in

2019, a man in Christchurch, New Zealand, entered two
mosques and killed 51 people, having been radicalized by the
Norwegian white supremacist, Anders Breivik, who himself had
murdered seventy-seven people in 2012. Again, under American
law, Breivik would not have been culpable for his inflammatory
speech.

Because websites and online videos inciting murder

typically do not cause harm immediately, their suppression
would be deemed an unconstitutional violation of the legal right
to freedom of expression.39
This American perspective on “dangerous speech” is by
no means universally shared, as Howard points out.40 Indeed, it
stands in sharp contrast with the law of the United Kingdom,
where encouraging terrorism is itself deemed a crime.

The

British example, moreover, is emulated in most liberal
democracies’ treatment of dangerous speech.41 If these countries
are “right,” the American judiciary must have this matter wrong.

38

Id. at 208.
Id. at 209.
40
Id. at 210.
41
Id.
39

82

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

Of course, the central topic of our paper is not
“dangerous” speech; it is “electoral” speech. More specifically,
it is false electoral speech. The point remains, however, that it
would be indefensibly narrow-minded to uncritically accept
existing American legal practices without due reflection,
especially in light of the important relation between accurate
speech and democratic desiderata, as we shall argue in Section
III.
II. FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRATIC GOALS
As noted in Section I, freedom of speech is a core feature
of democracy. But what makes it so valuable or so special? Why
think that a strongly maintained system of free speech is an
important component of a truly democratic system of
government? Even if we take it as given that democracy is the
most justifiable form of government, why does it follow that free
speech is needed? And why should the free speech (or free
expression) system take the specific form–– and interpretation––
that the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution takes?
Different answers to these questions have been offered by
different writers. In this section and those that follow, we
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examine some sample answers and see which—if any—offer
compelling answers.
In their 2017 book, constitutional scholars Erwin
Chemerinsky and Howard Gillman write as follows:
Freedom of expression––which includes verbal
and nonverbal behaviors that express a person’s
opinion, point of view, or identity––is considered
a fundamental right within our political system.
The Supreme Court has called it “the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other
form of freedom” and has ruled that it occupies a
“preferred place” in our constitutional scheme.42
Chemerinsky and Gillman acknowledge that there may
be good reasons to limit speech. “[Speech] has been used to mock
and bully, and to question the dignity of entire groups of people
in ways that put them at risk. It has been used to objectify
women, sexualize children. Speech can invade privacy or ruin a
reputation … [and] threaten national security.”43 Nonetheless,
they defend a preferred place for freedom of expression as

42

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY AND HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON
CAMPUS 22 (2017).
43
Id. at 23.
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essential for freedom of thought and essential for democratic selfgovernance.44
Their account of why freedom of speech is essential to
democracy proceeds as follows:
[F]reedom of speech is essential to democratic selfgovernment because democracy presupposes that
the people may freely receive information and
opinion on matters of public interest and the
actions of government officials. The act of voting
still occurs in many autocratic societies where
speech is severely limited and government officials
punish people who criticize the government…. It
is not the act of voting that creates a self-governing
society but rather the people’s ability to formulate
and communicate their opinions about what
decisions or policies will best advance the
community’s welfare.45
Surely the last statement is a bit too quick. Receipt and
expression of communication is important but not itself sufficient
to create a self-governing society. Voting matters! If nobody but
a reigning dictator has the power to vote (or enact whatever laws
they wish), then ordinary citizens might communicate until they
are blue in the face without creating a democratic government.
Democracy is established through institutions, where formal

44
45

Id.
Id. at 25.
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voting is critical. Suppose a vast bulk of the population is
consigned to penitentiaries where they may communicate with
each other but have no formal opportunity to execute their
preferred plans or schemes. Communication can often be
helpful, crucially so, but talk in itself will not suffice to influence
government, democratic or otherwise, without institutions to
implement this influence.
There are additional reasons why the power to
communicate doesn’t guarantee democracy. Suppose a group of
citizens has the power to hack into their compatriots’ devices,
conveying radically misleading messages (as in the case of
Arnold in Section I), and these messages are taken as true. Such
widespread communication power used for deceitful ends would
be seen by many to fall short of democracy because the vote does
not truly represent the will of the people. Group X’s power to
misuse or misdirect group Y’s communicative power can
undercut the alleged democratic value of Y’s communicative
power. This is not to deny the importance of communication or
information in helping to constitute a democracy, but a more

86
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nuanced approach that identifies the democratic value at stake is
necessary.
The same point holds for other popular approaches to
democratic theory which assign great importance to information
or knowledge. The oldest approach of this kind is the
“marketplace of ideas” rationale for free speech.46 This idea dates
back to John Milton, who wrote, “Let her [Truth] and Falsehood
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and
open encounter.”47 In the twentieth century, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes articulated the same idea as follows: “the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market.”48 Let us evaluate its claim to
centrality.
The rationale begins with the assumption that a
democratic society aims to get the truth: the more truth the
better. It then makes the claim that the best way for society to get
the truth is to allow everyone to express his or her viewpoints to

46

See generally Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth,
33 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1984).
47
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF
UNLICENSED PRINTING 45 (H.B. Cotterill ed., MacMillan & Co. 1959)
(1644).
48
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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others, keeping government out of the picture. Allegedly, this
will allow everyone to defend their respective views, and all will
profit.
The free-marketplace-of-ideas theory is arguably the most
influential argument on behalf of freedom of speech, but is it true
to say that such marketplaces are optimal systems for generating
true beliefs?49 Doubts can initially be raised by the fact that no
controlled experiment has been conducted that attests to the
superiority of a marketplace system in a social arena. In the
absence of any careful formulation and controlled study of such
systems, let us reflect on a few familiar existing systems that aim
to generate true beliefs. In each case we may ask: Do experienced
system designers, interested in the generation of true belief,
choose a free-market structure, in which everyone may speak
and no governmental or supervisory agency is allowed to
interfere with their speech? Have these designers studied the
truth-delivering properties of this system and found that its

49

For a prominent formulation of doubt about the free marketplace of ideas
argument, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY CH. 2 (1982). The line of skepticism developed in the current
article is complementary to, but distinct from, Schauer’s.
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results are superior to those of competing systems, in which, for
example, only designated individuals are allowed to speak?
What we will find is that it is quite common for
“selective” or “restrictive” systems to be chosen in place of
“open-to-all” systems. Even where system designers are
intelligent and well-intentioned, they often choose “selective”
systems as superior to completely open ones.
To illustrate this, consider some examples chosen from
the legal realm. Courts commonly engage in highly selective
procedures. Judges admit certain individuals to testify (i.e. to
speak) before the jury, whereas other individuals are excluded
from delivering any testimony in court. Two categories of people
are most likely to be deemed appropriate to serve as courtroom
witnesses: eye-witness testifiers and expert-witness testifiers.50 In
each type of witness, the judge allows suitable individuals to
testify but disallows others, depending on their relevant
qualifications.51
Although rules of evidence have been subject to change
over time, the general practice of conferring testimonial roles to

50
51

FED. R. EVID. 602; FED. R. EVID. 702.
FED. R. EVID. 602; FED. R. EVID. 702.
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selected individuals and denying such roles to others based on
their qualifications have persisted. They either must have
suitable scientific knowledge52 or have witnessed some event
relevant to the case under litigation.53 These standards are spelled
out in appropriate rules of evidence (e.g., the “Federal Rules of
Evidence”), which lay down rules that govern the system and
considerations that should be weighed to determine if a witness
should testify.54 Nobody ever suggests that random people, who
merely wish to opine on the case, are entitled to do so.
This is clearly not a free-marketplace-of-ideas system, yet
it is one that is widely used and accepted despite the importance
of true beliefs in the court system. Few complaints are heard
from the general electorate that they are deprived of speech
opportunities or that universal admissibility to speak in court
would improve the system. This is a case in which the “open
marketplace” for speech is a possible fact-seeking system that
courts of law could adopt. But none have done so. Is it so clear

52

See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 587–95 (1993);
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
53
FED. R. EVID. 602.
54
Id.
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that careful reflection on political debate would lead to very
different results?
The courtroom case is one of many examples where the
chosen system does not feature the practice of letting everyone
speak as they please. Consider another example drawn from the
law. The Securities and Exchange Commission restricts what
people may say while selling stocks and bonds.55 This provision
helps buyers avoid being misled or deceived by sellers’ claims.
Such speech restrictions obviously depart from the assumption
that a free market for speech, left to itself, would best generate
true beliefs and avoid error. Once again, people who are
knowledgeable about business dealings are apparently not
persuaded that an unhindered speech market is the best way to
generate truth. While the rhetoric alleges that the marketplace
system is best, experienced system designers (or evaluators)
evidently feel that constraints on certain types of speech lead to
a more reliable system.
The issue raised here is continuous with the central issue
posed in Section I. The First Amendment, under its orthodox

55

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-6 (2019) (restricting “false or misleading
statements”).
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interpretation, is strongly tilted toward protecting freedom of
speech. Especially in political matters, even knowingly false
statements may not be sufficient to incur government
regulation.56 Does this really promote democratic and truthoriented upshots?
As has been pointed out by numerous scholars, any
interpretation of the First Amendment must be constructed from
its functions or purposes.57 As Thomas Emerson argues, “Any
study of the legal doctrines and institutions necessary to maintain
an effective system of freedom of expression must be based upon
the functions performed by the system in our society, the
dynamics of its operation, and the general role of law and legal
institutions in supporting it.”58
Three major purposes have been proposed for the First
Amendment.59 The first proposal is cognitive. The First

56

See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
5–9 (1970); ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC
FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN
STATE 5 (2012).
58
EMERSON, supra note 58, at 5.
59
POST, supra note 58, at 6. For a survey of other justifications that have
been offered for freedom of speech beyond the three major proposals, see
57
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Amendment protection for speech is said to be “advancing
knowledge and discovering truth.”60 It is the cognitive proposal
that underlies the marketplace-of-ideas theory we have just
questioned. The second proposal is that the purpose of the First
Amendment is ethical. Here, the goal of the First Amendment is
said to be “assuring individual self-fulfillment,” so that every
person can realize his or her “character and potentialities as a
human being.”61 The third proposal is political. Here, the purpose
of the First Amendment is said to be “facilitating the
communicative processes necessary for successful democratic
self-governance.”62
Building off the ethical proposal, a popular idea behind
freedom of speech goes under the label of “autonomy.”
Autonomy, or individual self-fulfillment, is the “principle that all
persons ought to be accorded the equal dignity to fulfill their
unique individual potential.”63 Emerson defended a central
purpose of the First Amendment as “assuring individual self-

Leslie Kendrick, Another First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2106–
12 (2018).
60
POST, supra note 58, at 6 (quoting Emerson, supra note 58, at 6).
61
Id. (emphasis added).
62
Id.
63
Id. at 10.
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fulfillment.”64 C. Edwin Baker, a prominent proponent of the
autonomy conception, argued, “In making collective decisions,
people should be as unrestrained as possible, not because this
form of process necessarily leads to the wisest decisions, but
because the process is an attempt to embody a fundamental value
of liberty in the sphere of necessarily collective decisions . . . .
Liberty, not democracy, is fundamental.”65
Despite the appeal of autonomy as a fundamental value,
it cannot sustain an interpretation of the First Amendment as the
central purpose.66 Autonomy can be manifested through any
form

of

behavior,

not

merely

communication,

which

undermines the privilege granted to speech in the First
Amendment.67

Robert

Post

convincingly

dismisses

the

autonomy interpretation with the following argument:
If the protection of autonomy were a fundamental
goal of the First Amendment, all expression
equally connected to the achievement of

64

EMERSON, supra note 58, at 6.
C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 30 (1989).
66
See T. M. Scanlon, Why Not Base Free Speech on Autonomy or Democracy?, 97
VA. L. REV. 541, 546 (2011) (arguing that “autonomy” is understood in too
many different ways to capture the interests at stake in First Amendment
protection).
67
Post, supra note 58, at 10.
65
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individual self-fulfillment would be accorded
equal First Amendment value. But this is
emphatically not the case. Much speech that may
be of great importance to the autonomy of
individual speakers receives no First Amendment
coverage at all.68
A specific example of this point concerns the regulation of speech
by state employees:
First Amendment coverage materializes only
when employee speech is about a matter “of public
concern,” because only such speech is “entitled to
special protection.” First Amendment doctrine
attributes no constitutional significance to the
importance that such speech may bear to the
autonomy or self-fulfillment of an employee.69
This serves as a counterexample to the autonomy interpretation
because expression ought to have the same value to autonomy
whether it is about a matter of public concern or not.70 Special
treatment for matters of public concern implies that autonomy is
not the primary purpose of the First Amendment.
The political purpose of the First Amendment has been
most closely associated with prominent theorists Alexander

68

Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11–12.
70
“Both freedom of political speech and freedom of other speech embody
the same value—respect for individual liberty.” Baker, supra note 57, at 31.
Baker unconvincingly attributes the apparent focus on political speech in
First Amendment case law to pragmatic considerations, rather than a
justified emphasis on political speech. Id. at 33–36.
69
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Meiklejohn71 and Robert Bork.72 Meiklejohn and Bork each offer
a version of a principle where First Amendment coverage does
not extend to the autonomy interests of speakers but rather
protects the rights of voters to receive information. Thus,
Meiklejohn and Bork concur that political considerations
provide the basis for First Amendment interpretation. However,
Post extends the political or democratic conception in a fruitful
way. Successful self-government requires not only that voters can
influence political decisions, but also that voters share a
“warranted conviction that they are engaged in the process of
deciding their own fate.”73 The First Amendment does not only
extend to explicitly political subjects, as Bork argued,74 but also
to literary, artistic, and scientific expression.75 Therefore, Bork

71

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948), in POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960).
72
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L. J. 1 (1971).
73
Robert C. Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1523 (1997) (reviewing OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM
DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER
(1966)).
74
Bork, supra note 64, at 28.
75
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22–23 (1973).
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and Meiklejohn’s principle does not correspond with wellentrenched principles of First Amendment law.76
Post argues that these early theorists of free speech and
democracy fell short because they underestimated the nature of
democracy.77 Rather than a conception of majoritarian rule
focused entirely on decision-making power, democracy rests on
the value of self-government, the notion that those subject to the
law should experience themselves as coauthors of that law.78
Constitutional democracies instantiate this value by ensuring
that governments are responsive and subordinate to public
opinion, and the First Amendment plays a necessary role by
visibly guaranteeing everyone the possibility to influence public
opinion.79

76

Post, supra note 58, at 16–17.
Id. For a critical account of the democratic theories of the First
Amendment under these early theorists’ more limited conceptions of
democracy, see Baker, supra note 66, at 25–37.
78
Meiklejohn moved partially toward support for this view of democracy,
extending First Amendment protection to the arts, sciences, and humanities
as part of the range of communication from which the voter derives
knowledge. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961
SUP. CT. REV. 245, 256–57. See also Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times
Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT.
REV. 191, 221.
79
Post, supra note 58, at 17.
77
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Post’s extension of the political principle interpretation
does not end at the need to tolerate all views. “It follows from
this analysis that First Amendment coverage should extend to all
efforts deemed normatively necessary for influencing public
opinion.”80 Understanding Post’s perspective depends on
appreciating the role that truth must play in a defensible
conception of legitimate authority. Post is unpersuaded that a
broad interpretation of First Amendment protections can apply
to all areas of speech because an interpretation that is indifferent
to true and false content does not live up to the standard of
knowledge––which implies truth according to philosophical
consensus––and knowledge is normatively necessary for
informed public opinion.81 This leads Post to the following
explanation:
If content and viewpoint neutrality is the
cornerstone of the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence, the production of
expert knowledge rests on quite different
foundations. It depends upon the continuous
exercise of peer judgment to distinguish
meritorious from specious opinions. Expert
knowledge requires exactly what normal First
80
81

Id. at 18.
Id. at 7–9.
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Amendment doctrine prohibits. “The First
Amendment … ‘as a general matter … means that
government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content.’”82
A broad interpretation that applied content-neutral First
Amendment protection to disciplinary standards would
undermine the foundations of expert knowledge.
To put the matter simply, if “the First Amendment
recognizes no such thing as a ‘false’ idea,” then it
cannot sustain, or even tolerate, the disciplinary
practices necessary to produce expert knowledge.
The creation of expert knowledge requires
practices that seek to separate true ideas from false
ones. A scientific journal bound by First
Amendment doctrine, and thus disabled from
making necessary editorial judgments about the
justification and truth of submissions, could not
long survive.83
This leaves an apparent paradox at the heart of a theory
attaching a political purpose to the First Amendment. To see
themselves as coauthors of the laws that govern them, Americans
should see the speech of all persons treated with toleration and
equality, not decreed from higher authorities, but to ensure that
public opinion is founded on truth and knowledge, disciplines

82

Id. at 9 (quoting Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343,
2347 (2011)).
83
Id. at 9.
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must be given the latitude to distinguish reliable beliefs from
unreliable beliefs, a process that depends crucially on expert
authority.84
Post calls these two values “democratic legitimation” and
“democratic competence.” “Democratic legitimation” is the
function the First Amendment plays when it allows citizens to
see themselves as coauthors of the government and the law.85
“Democratic competence” is the “cognitive empowerment of
persons within the public discourse, which in part depends on
their access to disciplinary knowledge.”86 It captures those
institutions that are necessary for the formation of public
opinion, including disciplinary authority to determine which
views constitute true knowledge before those ideas contribute to
the formation of public opinion. As argued by democratic
theorist John Dewey, “genuinely public policy cannot be

84

Id. at 29–34.
Id. at 33-34. A similar emphasis on democratic legitimacy can be found in
James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free
Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 498–500 (2011). On the other hand,
Steven Shiffrin rejects the value of self-government outright, adopting a far
more limited conception of democracy that denies legitimacy is possible on
a large scale. Steven Shiffrin, Dissent, Democratic Participation, and First
Amendment Methodology, 97 VA. L. REV. 559, 562 (2011).
86
Post, supra note 58, at 33–34.
85
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generated unless it be informed by knowledge, and this
knowledge does not exist except when there is systematic,
thorough,

and

well-equipped

search

and

record.”87

A

government that manipulates disciplinary knowledge sets the
terms of its own legitimacy by undermining the capacity of the
public to form autonomous views critical of state policy.88
Post solves the apparent paradox between legitimation,
requiring broad protection necessary for tolerating all views, and
competence, requiring restrictive disciplinary authority, by
separating realms.89 Both values are always present, but for Post,
within the public discourse, democratic legitimation is lexically
supreme––leading to expansive protections of public speech –
while outside the public discourse, there is more latitude to
prioritize democratic competence by allowing disciplines
latitude to police knowledge.90
In ensuing sections, we will concur broadly with Post’s
definition of values, adopting a political conception of the First
Amendment and likewise distinguishing between values in

87

JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 177–79 (1927).
Post, supra note 58, at 33.
89
Id. at 34.
90
Id. at 34.
88
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democratic legitimation and democratic competence. We will,
however, disagree with his prioritization of these values. For
Post, within the public discourse, democratic legitimation is
always more important than democratic competence.91 In other
words, it is more important within the public discourse to
tolerate all views equally than to ensure competent and true
knowledge. Thus, Post would not support regulation of fake
news within the public discourse or within campaigns.
We disagree with Post’s prioritization and will provide a
basis for regulation of false campaign speech to protect electoral
integrity in the modern speech environment.92 We will argue that
the presence of rampant false campaign speech undermines the
faith of the citizens in the soundness of the election results and
in the soundness of the democracy. Thus, false campaign speech
is analogous to perjury, and we will defend the necessity and
appropriateness of regulation. Post's dichotomy between the
public discourse (where there cannot be speech regulation) and
knowledge generating disciplines and institutions (where there

91
92

Id.
See infra Part V.
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can be speech regulation) is unsustainable, and regulation of false
campaign speech may be defended under free speech values.
This is, for now, just a sketch. Before building on that
sketch, it is worth pausing over a different approach to speech
theory that is more widely endorsed and would also protect a
very wide range of speech and expression.
III. DEMOCRACY, VOTING, AND DISINFORMATION
In Section I, we encountered the problem of how a broad
interpretation of the First Amendment can be compatible with a
commitment to democracy when the election environment is
bombarded with fake news. Given the strong protection that the
First Amendment confers on political speech,93 how can a legalpolitical system that aspires to be a leading democracy deal
successfully with the case––discussed in Section I––of fake news
interference in an American election? It seems to open a wide
door to discursive encroachment on voter decision-making that
(in our hypothetical case) could easily lead to an undermining of
voter influence and an inability of voters to ensure (or even make

93

“We have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance. It is speech on matters of public concern that is at the heart of the
First Amendment's protection.” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
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it probable) that elections reflect the intentions of the voters. In
other words, if democracy is open to pervasive campaigns of
disinformation, this may well undermine a significant part of the
value that we expect voting to deliver.
Let us begin with a simple model of the aim and structure
of representative democracy. This model is formulated by Alvin
Goldman (the lead author of this article) in his book, Knowledge
in a Social World (1999).94
Representative democracies feature a division of labor.
Ordinary citizens are not expected to devise or execute the best
political means to their political ends. That is what
representatives are hired to do. Ordinary citizens have the job of
selecting officials who will do the best job of achieving their
political ends.
What should we assume about a citizen’s goals or ends?
These may range from egoistic to altruistic ends of many
varieties. The result of a candidate being elected and holding
office for a given term, let us suppose, is a large combination of

94

ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 315–48 (1999).
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(politically related) outcomes. Call any such combination of
outcomes an “outcome set.” Each possible outcome might be
conceptualized as some economic or societal state of affairs, such
as the unemployment level, the cost of living, the availability of
healthcare, educational opportunities, etc.
Continuing with the Goldman model,95 assume that each
voter has a (tacit) preference ordering over the outcome-sets that
might occur. For each pair of possible outcome-sets, a voter
either (tacitly) prefers the first outcome-set to the second, prefers
the second to the first, or is indifferent between the two. Given a
few additional assumptions, we can then draw some general
conclusions about how voters will decide to cast their votes.
First, assume that all electoral races have exactly two
candidates.96 Then a voter who plans to vote in a race featuring
candidates C and C* would first want to compare the outcomeset that would occur if C were elected to the outcome-set that
would occur if C* were elected. If voter V judges (believes) that
the outcome-set that would be generated by C would be superior
from her perspective to the outcome-set that would be generated

95
96

Id.
For further detail on this scenario, see id. at 320–25.
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by C*, then V would vote for candidate C. And if V judges that
the outcome-set that would be generated by C* would be
preferable from her perspective to the outcome-set generated by
C, then V would vote for C*.97
Given these relations, the crucial question for V to
consider is: Which of these two candidates, if elected, would
generate a better outcome-set than the other? Call this the “Core
Voter Question.” To have a determinate answer, however, the
question must be relativized to a specified voter and his
preference ordering. Obviously, each voter who poses the
question poses a different question than the other voters pose,
because each references his or her own preference-ordering. For
analogous reasons, which answers are the true, or correct,
answers to their person-relative questions will differ from voter
to voter. For example, the answer “candidate C would be better”
might be true for one voter while “candidate C* would be better”
might be true for another voter.98

97

Ties are ignored in the interest of simplicity.
Since the truth value of these types of statements depends on the ensuing
outcome-sets that transpire, which in turn depend on actions taken by the
98
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We now ask how an individual voter’s choice of a
candidate affects that voter’s goal satisfaction, and, more
generally, how the choices of the many voters affect the
welfare—or “success”—of the electorate as a whole. Relatedly,
we ask how the larger electorate’s success in selecting the
“correct” candidates—“correct” from their point of view—bears
on the democratic “quality” of the political transaction.
We can call the answer to such a question “Core Voter
Knowledge.”99 The term “knowledge” is used here in a weak
sense in which it means simply “true belief” (whether or not the
belief is justified). Thus, if voter V believes that the proposition
“Jones is the best candidate [for me],” then this belief will be true
as long as Jones would indeed generate an outcome-set that is
superior to that of the other candidate (as judged by V’s
preference ordering). Of course, merely guessing will not reliably
generate a high proportion of accurate Core Voter Beliefs. But

winning candidate plus actions taken by other political (and non-political)
“players,” one might wonder whether there is any robust truth of the matter
at the time that a voter casts his or her ballot. However, we are
presupposing a deterministic framework which presumes that (given a
specific set of electoral votes, etc.) there will be a very complex set of
ensuing events that fix a determinate truth value (given the preference
orderings of the voter in question).
99
GOLDMAN, supra note 95, at 323.
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well-formed background beliefs may succeed in promoting a
high percentage of Core Voter Knowledge.100
Now let us return to the case of Arnold and the antiHillary Clinton ad on Facebook, falsely claiming that Clinton
had FBI agents killed. Let us say that Arnold and many others
read the posted ad and believe its contents.101 They therefore
revise their beliefs about the value of the outcome-set that would
result from Clinton’s being elected compared with the value of
the outcome-set of Trump being elected. In the language of our
model, these revised beliefs impact their Core Voter Knowledge–
–their beliefs about which candidate will bring about a better
outcome-set, by their own lights.
With these changes of belief, those voters now favor
Trump over Clinton and vote accordingly, changing their answer
to the Core Voter Question. Hence, many of these voters
(including Arnold) cast their votes for Trump, where those votes

100

Id. at 325.
We will address whether this assumption is reasonable in Section V,
where we offer three reasons to believe that enough voters will believe false
campaign speech to undermine the integrity of the election process. See,
infra, sec. V.
101
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are actually inaccurate assessments of the comparative merits (or
demerits) of what would ensue if Trump were elected (as
compared with what would ensue if Clinton were elected), a
decrease in Core Voter Knowledge.102
Turning to the real world now—which is not far removed
from the world we have been describing—there is ample
evidence from Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s inquiry that
massive disinformation campaigns occurred and that the
disinformation may have swung the result of the 2016
Presidential election.103 While it is difficult to say in such a
complex system if those campaigns actually turned this election,
it is easier to determine that there is good reason for us, and for
fellow voters, to believe this decrease in Core Voter Knowledge
impacted the integrity of the election results. This pervasive
disinformation gives citizens reason to doubt themselves as
genuine coauthors of their government, which is to say they have
reason to doubt the legitimacy of the election results.104
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Goldman, supra note 95, at 328.
See generally KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, CYBERWAR (2018); ROBERT S.
MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, VOL. I (2019).
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Many citizens would say that this doubt has indeed been
a “loss” or a “harm” suffered by American democracy, even
setting aside the anti-democratic inclinations of the Trump
administration. An ill-gotten win, or even the perception of such
a win, is a defeat for democracy because it undermines the
result’s status as the collective will of the democratic process.
Although not identical to one in which an election has been
manipulated directly through a corrupt process, a similar doubt
is produced when citizens cannot trust that their own vote or
their fellow citizens’ votes are free from systematic distortion.
The medium by which our hypothetical Arnold was
attacked shares with its real counterpart the same pathway to
influence: disinformation. Disinformation is false information that
is intended to mislead the hearer, as opposed to misinformation,
which

is

merely

false.105

We

have

just

argued

that

disinformation, when directed to voters, can harm a democracy
by undermining the real or perceived legitimacy of its
institutions. Our central question then is whether this harm to

105

Disinformation, RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY
(1991).
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legitimacy is serious enough to be met by government action to
deter such disinformation.
Thus far, there seems to be no movement within the
federal government or judicial system to enact or prepare for
such a step. But there are signs that ordinary people, and players
engaged in various sectors of the media, sense the need and
appropriateness of taking action. In July 2018, Facebook
announced that it would begin removing false information that
could lead to people being physically harmed.106 This was largely
a response to episodes in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and India, in
which rumors that spread on Facebook led to real world attacks
on ethnic minorities.107 To be sure, physical harm is not the same
as electoral harm, but many American citizens would say that
the political harm suffered also rises to a sufficient degree that
action is warranted. We should not forget that more than a
dozen American states have adopted statutes that allow for
actions to be taken against false campaign speech.108

106

Sheera Frenkel, Facebook to Remove Misinformation That Leads to Violence,
N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/technology/facebook-to-removemisinformation-that-leads-to-violence.html.
107
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108
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The focus then turns to the Supreme Court, which
ultimately must uphold these statutes under the First
Amendment if they are to be enforced. Are there any grounds to
interpret such a regulation as fitting the purpose of the First
Amendment? We must ask whether there are any grounds to
interpret such a regulation as fitting the purpose of the First
Amendment.
IV. FALSE CAMPAIGN SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION
The stakes are high when a democracy moves to regulate
false campaign speech. On one hand, “the First Amendment ‘has
its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech uttered during
a campaign for political office.”109 On the other hand, concerns
about political legitimacy are at their most poignant when they
impact the vote, the mechanism through which voters exert
democratic voice. The importance of these democratic ends has
been acknowledged by the Court as limiting the protection of the
First Amendment. “That speech is used as a tool for political
ends does not automatically bring it under the protective mantle

109

Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)
(quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
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of the Constitution. For the use of the known lie as a tool is at
once at odds with the premises of democratic government . . .”110
The question then is how to reconcile these competing aims––
protection of the value of free speech during a campaign against
the harm that a known lie or falsehood can do to the legitimacy
and premises of democratic government.
“[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”111 This
demands that content-based restrictions––where regulation of
false campaign speech is a content-based restriction––are
“presumed invalid” so that the “Government bears the burden
of showing their constitutionality.”112 Presumptive invalidity
follows the tradition of broad First Amendment protections
against content based regulation absent specific categories of
lesser protections established by the Court, such as incitement,

110

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 65 (1983)).
112
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obscenity, defamation, “fighting words,” child pornography,
fraud, true threats, and imminent threats.113
A. False Statements and United States v. Alvarez
Any consideration of laws regulating false campaign
speech and fake news must consider carefully the recent case
United States v. Alvarez.114 In Alvarez, the respondent appealed his
conviction under the Stolen Valor Act,115 which made it a crime
to falsely claim receipt of military medals, with an enhanced
penalty for false claiming the Congressional Medal of Honor, as
Alvarez had claimed.116 Alvarez is particularly pertinent to our
inquiry because it was a content-based regulation of false speech,
where the respondent told an intended, undisputed lie regarding
his service history.
Citing numerous precedential cases suggesting that false
statements have no value and hence no First Amendment
protection, the Government argued that the Stolen Valor Act
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should be upheld.117 For instance, the Court has stated that
“[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless [because]
they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace
of ideas. . . .”118 Furthermore, false statements “are not protected
by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful
statements.”119 “Spreading false information in and of itself
carries no First Amendment credentials,”120 and “there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact.”121
Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy, speaking for a plurality of
four Justices with two concurring, rejected the argument that
false speech should be in a general category that is presumptively
unprotected.122 Kennedy identified three features that speak
against a falsehood as a category. First, each precedent case
featured a “legally cognizable harm”123 associated with the false
statement. While falsity was not irrelevant to those decisions, it
did not support a categorical rule that false statements receive no
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First Amendment protection.124 Second, following New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,125 the “Court has been careful to instruct
that falsity alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the
First Amendment. The statement must be a knowing or reckless
falsehood.”126 Thus, a high mens rea standard of “actual malice,”
entailing knowledge or reckless disregard, must accompany a
false statement.127 Third, the statute must be narrowly tailored to
a legitimate government interest.128 The Stolen Valor Act was not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet this standard.129
These restrictions reflect Kennedy’s application of a strict
scrutiny standard. In his concurrence, Justice Breyer joins with
the plurality’s invalidation of the Stolen Valor Act, but does so
under

a

lower

level

of

intermediate

scrutiny.130

This

disagreement leaves some window of uncertainty as to the level
of scrutiny that should apply to a regulation of false campaign
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speech. In 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson,131 the Eighth Circuit
applied Alvarez to review the Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices
Act132—a statute banning false campaign speech133—and applied
a strict scrutiny standard, ruling that Breyer’s intermediate
scrutiny would not apply to a statute banning false campaign
speech.134 Because political speech occupies the core of the
protection of the First Amendment, whereas Alvarez applied only
to false, non-political speech, strict scrutiny was the appropriate
standard.135 While this issue remains contestable, we will
proceed assuming strict scrutiny will apply.
While Alvarez did not rule directly on false campaign
speech, numerous commentators have argued that it puts those
statutes in constitutional peril. “The result of Alvarez is that laws
regulating false campaign speech are in even more constitutional
trouble than they were before, and any attempts to regulate such
speech will have to be narrow, targeted, and careful in their
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766 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2014).
MINN. STAT. § 211B.06 (2018), invalidated by 281 Care Comm. v.
Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 785 (8th Cir. 2014).
133
See Lieffring, supra note 23, at 1059.
134
Arneson, 766 F.3d at 784.
135
See Joel Timmer, Fighting Falsity: Fake News, Facebook, and the First
Amendment, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 669, 680 (2017).
132

2019]

FREE SPEECH, FAKE NEWS

117

choice of remedies.”136 These concerns reflect the difficulty of
meeting the strict scrutiny standard presumably applied to false
campaign speech in a political election.
B. Legally Cognizable Harm
Alvarez presents a difficulty for false campaign speech
laws because it disallows the identification of false speech as a
category for less protection. The plurality distinguishes precedent
cases indicating lesser protection for false statements because
they featured “some other legally cognizable harm associated
with a false statement.”137 It is important here to carefully
consider the examples used to establish this distinction. One
form of false speech that can unquestionably be regulated is
perjury. In distinguishing, Kennedy states,
It is not simply because perjured statements are
false that they lack First Amendment protection.
Perjured testimony ‘is at war with justice’ because
it can cause a court to render a ‘judgment not
resting on truth.’ In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227
(1945). Perjury undermines the function and
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province of the law and threatens the integrity of
judgments that are the basis of the legal system.138
The legally cognizable harm present in perjury but lacking in
Alvarez is that perjury undermines the function of the law and
threatens the integrity of the institution. This is precisely the type
of concern we identified in Section III, where we argued that
disinformation undermines the function of elections in
legitimating the government and threatens the integrity of the
electoral institution. If such a harm is cognizable in perjury, then
it must also be cognizable in false campaign speech.
Similarly, the plurality finds that statutes banning false
representation of oneself as speaking on behalf of the
government to “protect the integrity of Government processes,
quite apart from merely restricting false speech.”139 Such statutes
protect the good repute and dignity of government service,
setting aside whatever financial or property loss may result.140
Again, this example shows that mere falsity is being
distinguished from cases where the false speech undermines the
function and integrity of the process. Where false campaign
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speech and disinformation undermine the electoral process, the
distinction in Alvarez does not speak against it.
C. Actual Malice
A second challenge is to show that false campaign speech
exhibits “actual malice,” a standard that has limited action on
false claims since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in 1964.141
Recognizing that incorrect statements are inevitable in a healthy
political debate, Sullivan protects some false speech to carve out
“breathing space” for political discourse to survive.142 Thus, to
bring a libel action against critics of a public official, it must be
demonstrated that the critic exhibited “actual malice,” with
knowledge that the statement is false or with reckless disregard
to its falsity.143 Any lesser standard would have a chilling effect
on protected speech because would-be critics would fear the
expense and difficulty of demonstrating the truth of the
criticism.144
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The actual malice standard, extended to false campaign
speech in dicta in Brown v. Hartlage, is an exacting standard.145 It
is not enough to show ill will, gross negligence, or reliance on
biased testimony.146 Rather, it must be shown that the defendant
made a false statement with a “high degree of awareness of . . .
probable falsity.”147 This standard presents a serious evidentiary
burden on any prosecutor seeking to convict under a false
campaign speech statute.
Some doubt remains that the actual malice standard will
be extended to false campaign speech. Lee Goldman argues that
Brown is weak precedent that does not reflect subsequent
reasoning of the Court. Where in Brown, the Court recognized
the State’s interest in regulating the electoral process as
“legitimate,” recent cases have taken a stronger position.148 In
McConnell v. FEC, the Court stated, “the electoral process is the
very ‘means through which a free society democratically
translates
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action.’”149 Under this more significant constitutional interest,
there is “no place for a strong presumption against
constitutionality, of the sort often thought to accompany the
words ‘strict scrutiny.’”150 Goldman argues instead that a
balancing standard is more appropriate, which would be
accompanied by a lower mens rea standard.151 We flag this
argument here, though our position remains viable if actual
malice is applied.
D. Narrow Tailoring
The level of scrutiny determines the extent that
regulations must be tailored to meet a compelling government
interest. The intermediate scrutiny contemplated by the
concurrence in Alvarez requires a “fit between statutory ends and
means.”152 This level of scrutiny takes “account of the
seriousness of the speech-related harm the provision will likely
cause,

149

the

nature

and

importance

of

the

provision’s

540 U.S. 93, 137 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S.
377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
150
Id.
151
Goldman, supra note 138, at 907–09.
152
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).

122

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

countervailing objectives, the extent to which the provision will
tend to achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less
restrictive ways of doing so.”153 In contrast, strict scrutiny
“requires the Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers
a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.’”154 Each of these standards shares the element of a
compelling government interest, with the distinction being how
narrowly the regulations must be tailored to achieve that interest.
The outline of a compelling interest in electoral integrity
has been recognized by the Court.155 In Eu v. San Francisco
Democratic Central Committee, the Court found “a compelling
interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.”156 In
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., the Court found an
independent interest in “public confidence in the integrity of the
electoral process.”157 The Court has also found that an interest in
preventing fraud and libel “carries special weight during election
campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have serious
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adverse consequences for the public at large.”158 Citing Eu, the
Court concluded, “a State has a compelling interest in protecting
voters from confusion and undue influence.”159
This compelling interest is not enough on its own. For a
regulation of false campaign speech to survive strict scrutiny, the
government must show that the restriction is “actually
necessary” to achieve this compelling government interest.160
Actual necessity requires the government to demonstrate three
things. First, there must be a “direct causal link between the
restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”161
Overturning the Stolen Valor Act, the Court noted that the
government pointed to “no evidence” to establish this causal
connection.162 Second, it must show why “counterspeech would
not suffice to achieve its interest.”163 Third, it must show that

158

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349 (1995).
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (citing Eu v. S.F. Cty.
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S 214, 228–29 (1989)).
160
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725 (2012) (quoting Brown v.
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n., 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011)).
161
Id.
162
Id. at 726.
163
Id.
159

124

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

regulating speech is “the least restrictive means among available,
effective alternatives.”164
We will not offer exact language for a statute regulating
false campaign speech to meet the strict demands of narrow
tailoring. We will have to leave that task for a later day and
authors with more expertise in constitutional law.165 We can,
however, offer evidence to demonstrate a causal connection
between false campaign speech and harm to electoral integrity,
the compelling government interest at hand. This, we hope, will
provide defenders of statutes regulating false campaign speech
with one arrow in their quiver to make the case.
Before turning to that argument, we will provide an
overview of the state of the law, as we understand it. We began
emphasizing that the Court interprets the First Amendment in its
“fullest and most urgent application” when considering speech
in the course of a political election. This urgency has led the
Court to look on regulation of false speech with a great deal of
skepticism, and this skepticism shines through when we see how
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strictly it scrutinizes any regulation of false speech. Alvarez makes
clear that false speech alone will not be recognized as a category
of speech deserving lesser protection, but regulation of false
campaign speech is not only about falsity. False campaign
speech threatens the integrity of the election process and the
perception thereof, both of which have been acknowledged by
the Court as legitimate government interests. Neither of these
interests was at stake in Alvarez.166 Nonetheless, it is still
reasonably likely that the Court will impose strict scrutiny on
laws regulating false campaign speech, which requires a showing
of cognizable harm, actual malice, and narrow tailoring. Given
the skepticism of the Court, this is a tough case on all counts, but
we hope to demonstrate that a cognizable harm to a legitimate
government interest occurs in the presence of false campaign
speech, an important step toward defending regulation.
V. FAKE NEWS UNDERMINES DEMOCRATIC COMPETENCE
Our task in Section V is to provide evidence that
regulation of fake news and false campaign speech is “actually
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necessary” to meet the compelling government interest
recognized in Eu of preserving the integrity of the election
process. Recall from Alvarez that the government must show
three things to demonstrate that a regulation of speech is
“actually necessary” to achieve a compelling government
interest.167 First, there must be a direct causal link between the
restriction on speech and the injury to be prevented. Second, the
government must show that counter-speech would not suffice to
achieve the interest. Third, regulating speech must be the least
restrictive means to prevent injury to the compelling interest.168
A. A Direct Causal Link

In Section III, we introduced a framework where a voter,
Arnold, hears a piece of fake news and changes his vote on that
basis, and we argued that such a result should be seen as a harm
to democracy.169 For the sake of demonstration, we postulated
without argument that Arnold was influenced by a particular
piece of fake news. Here, we ask whether there is good reason to
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believe that sufficient voters will in fact land in Arnold’s position,
influenced by false campaign speech to alter their vote. This
would establish the causal link between false campaign speech
and a harm to electoral integrity. There are three reasons why we
might believe that voters will believe false statements of fact
when they are offered in the context of a campaign.
Since Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid offered reliance
on the testimony of others as a first principle in his studies of
human knowledge, philosophers have recognized that reliance
on others is a natural human propensity.170 Acceptance of
testimony is fundamental because it necessarily predates reason
and judgment. A child would perish for lack of knowledge if he
did not have a natural predisposition to believe in the truth of his
teacher’s statements.
Modern philosophers have added to this natural
propensity to argue that it is justified to grant prima facie
authority to others. As Tyler Burge argues, “Acceptance
underlies language acquisition. Lacking language, one could not
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engage in rational, deliberative activity, much less the primary
forms of human social cooperation.”171 Because reliance
underlies rationality and judgment, and since we must trust the
veracity of our own judgment to avoid radical skepticism, we are
required as a matter of consistency to grant prima facie authority
to the word and testimony of others.172 In short, it is natural and
justified to believe the word of others absent good reason not to
do so.
Prima facie or fundamental authority can be overridden
by contrary factors, such as evidence about the trustworthiness
of the speaker, which we will address shortly.173 However, the
fundamental role that reliance plays in human reason gives us
reason to believe that people will continue to trust testimony.
Reid wisely observes this continuing tendency to trust others:
But when our faculties ripen, we find reason to
check that propensity to yield to testimony and to
authority, which was so necessary and so natural
in the first period of life. . . . Yet, I believe, to the
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end of life, most men are more apt to go into this
extreme than into the contrary; and the natural
propensity still retains some force.174
The second reason we may expect voters to be influenced
by false campaign speech is that the speaker frequently has more
information than the voter. Whereas the first reason argued that
voters are predisposed and justified to grant fundamental
authority to testimony, this reason argues that they have good
reason to grant derivative authority to others. Derivative
authority follows from reasons to consider the speaker reliable.175
The information imbalance between a voter who has little time
to inform herself on politics and the political or media speaker is
often profound. This imbalance gives the voter reason to trust the
veracity of a piece of false campaign speech.
For a skeptical reader, the first two reasons may be
unconvincing. Surely, voters must know that political operatives
have built-in incentives to deceive, and these incentives should
cause voters to doubt the fundamental and derivative authority
entailed by the first two reasons. Expecting voters to take an
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unbiased and dispassionate view of the evidence surrounding a
piece of fake news or false campaign speech would ignore a
whole literature suggesting that voters view evidence through the
prism of their preexisting ideological affiliation.
As shown in the seminal study by Lord, Ross, and
Lepper, people tend to take evidence that confirms their prior
beliefs at face value, while subjecting evidence that disconfirms
prior beliefs to intense critical evaluation.176 This result was
extended by Ditto and Lopez, who found that less information
is required and less cognitive processing is devoted to reach
conclusions that we favor as opposed to conclusions we
disfavor.177 This lack of skepticism for confirming evidence is not
a consequence of the intelligence of the listener. In fact, some
evidence suggests that more intelligent listeners marshal that
intelligence to craft better explanations for the positions they
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otherwise desire to believe.178 A product of these effects is that
balanced information increases polarization along political lines.
Recent work indicates that the impact of party identity is
growing, such that party identity is as strong a predictor of
discriminatory feelings as race.179 Stanford University political
scientist Shanto Iyengar describes these effects on the tendency
to believe fake news: “If I’m a rabid Trump voter and I don’t
know much about public affairs, and I see something about some
scandal about Hillary Clinton’s aides being involved in an
assassination attempt, or that story about the pope endorsing
Trump, then I’d be inclined to believe it.”180 Where false
campaign speech follows prior beliefs or the party beliefs, voters
will be inclined to lend credence to it rather than look on it
skeptically. An analysis by economists Hunt Allcott and
Matthew Gentzkow shows that “Democrats and Republicans
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are both about 15 percent more likely to believe ideologically
aligned headlines.”181
We argue that these three reasons, (1) a natural tendency
to rely on others, (2) an information imbalance between voter
and a campaign speaker, and (3) a well-established tendency for
voters to accept as true evidence that confirms their ideological
beliefs, jointly give justification to believe that many voters will
be swayed by claims in fake news. This corresponds with recent
analyses that suggest that 75 percent of Americans who see fake
news believe it.182 Therefore, fake news and false campaign
speech are causally linked to a cognizable harm to the integrity
of the election process. Following the framework laid out in
Section III, we argue that fake news and false campaign speech
gives voters reason to doubt that elections represent the
coauthorship of the people, thereby undermining democratic
legitimacy.
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Of course, in a cacophonous election campaign, it would
be impossible in only the most unusual circumstances to show
that a campaign statement or fake news item exactly caused the
election result to flip, or for voters to lose faith in the legitimacy
of the election results. It is impossible to isolate a counterfactual.
This will always leave room for a dogmatic interlocutor to deny
the evidence of a causal link. We submit that these reasons
jointly give strong evidence of a causal link.
B. Counterspeech Would Not Suffice
The second requirement in showing “actual necessity”
echoes Justice Brandeis’s famous concurrence in Whitney v.
California.183 “If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence.”184 The influence of this dictum has created a
presumption in favor of solving speech harms through more
speech where possible, rather than a restriction of speech. Alvarez
embeds that presumption in the standard to meet “actual
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necessity” by requiring the government to show that more speech
could not solve the specific issue.185
Legal scholar Tim Wu has convincingly argued against
more speech as a solution to modern harms surrounding fake
news.186 The Brandeis solution assumes a world in which
listeners are under conditions of informational scarcity. In an
environment of informational scarcity, listeners are assumed to
have the time and interest necessary to consume available
information, and censorship—especially by the government–—
is the relevant factor for keeping ideas away from the public.187
Wu argues that these conditions no longer apply in a digital age
where fake news has become increasingly prevalent.188 Listeners
now have more information than they could possibly consume,
and it is not the information that is scarce, but rather the
attention of listeners.189
Recent research demonstrates that the problem is even
deeper than Wu may suggest. After investigating 126,000
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verified true and false stories tweeted more than 4.5 million times
by approximately 3 million people, researchers Soroush
Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral found that false political
rumors “diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more
broadly than the truth in all categories of information.”190
Psychological research demonstrates that hostile rumors are
shared to (1) coordinate attention and action against the target
group and (2) signal willingness to engage in conflict
escalation.191 Under these conditions, the sharer is less concerned
with the truth value of the rumor, and the hostile rumor is akin
to a rallying cry.192 In a political context, psychologists Michael
Bang Petersen, Mathias Osmundsen, and Kevin Arceneaux
show that political rumors are motivated by a desire to show
chaos and tear down the political system as such, rather than to
help one particular candidate.193
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Under these conditions, it is more effective for those
seeking to censor sound criticism to flood the environment with
false or misleading speech in sufficient volume to drown out the
offensive criticism and undermine confidence in the system. This
flooding has the effect of distracting the public and changing the
subject rather than silencing the opposition. Even the Chinese
and Russian governments have moved toward flooding tactics.194
The Chinese government fabricates an estimated 448 million
social media comments each year.195 To argue that more speech
would solve the harms to election integrity associated with fake
news and false campaign speech is to misunderstand the speech
environment in which they arise.
C. Regulating speech is the least restrictive means
The third requirement to show “actual necessity” is that
other, less restrictive, means could not be used to address the
legitimate interest.196 The possibility of less restrictive means is
also undermined by Wu’s argument cited above. Where fake
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news and false campaign speech are generated to garner
attention in a saturated market, silencing that speech is the least
restrictive means to address the threat to election integrity. Other
means to mitigate this effect might task the government with
directly vetting information or establishing a bureau of
information. These would be more restrictive means than the
regulation of campaign speech that we have addressed here.
It is worth noting that some features of our argument
make it less susceptible to government abuse than other
measures that may protect electoral integrity. By linking false
campaign speech and fake news to the integrity of the election
process, we are not asking the government or the courts to
directly determine where and when one particular election may
have been swayed by one particular piece of false campaign
speech. We argue that the government has a legitimate interest
in regulating false campaign speech because it has a tendency to
harm democratic competence and democratic legitimation.
False campaign speech harms democratic competence by
making it less likely that elections reflect the informed will of the
people. It harms democratic legitimation by undermining the
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faith that citizens should have that the electoral results represent
informed co-authorship.
Under this framing, we are asking courts to evaluate the
veracity of factual statements and to apply a mens rea standard
of actual malice, two judgments that should be justiciable in a
court of law. We are not asking courts to regulate opinions or
adjudicate “reasonable” claims, such as judgments that would
put courts in a position fraught with potential for politically
motivated abuse. Instead, we argue that this understanding of the
constitutional role of regulation of false campaign speech does
not leave the law open to unmanageable abuse.
Interpreted in the proper way, we submit that regulation
of false campaign speech can and should be seen as “actually
necessary” under the First Amendment. This interpretation
would meet the goals of democratic competence and democratic
legitimation underlying a compelling government interest in
electoral integrity. As we noted in Section IV, we do not see our
role as providing exact language that can pass constitutional
muster, but with sufficiently careful crafting, regulation of false
campaign speech should fit into a modern interpretation of the
First Amendment. To meet the challenges of running a
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successful democracy in the digital age, our constitutional
protections must reflect a modern understanding of electoral
tactics.
VI. CONCLUSORY REMARKS AND STEPS FORWARD
We have approached the issue of fake news in democracy
through the lens of state statutes barring false campaign speech—
statutes whose constitutionality has been further thrown into
doubt by the recent case United States v. Alvarez.197 While Alvarez
established that false speech is not a category deserving of lower
First Amendment protection, we have argued that false
campaign speech is not merely false speech, but also imperils a
compelling interest in electoral integrity. In this way, false
campaign speech is more closely analogous to laws barring
perjury than a law barring lies about the Medal of Honor.
We do not argue for regulation of false campaign speech
from the perspective of skeptics in the value of free speech or free
press. Rather, we see regulation of fake news in the modern
environment as consonant with traditional interests of strong
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advocates of free speech. The compelling interest in question –
preserving the integrity of the election process – has been
acknowledged by a Court fiercely protective of free political
expression. Protecting this interest makes possible democratic
self-government in exactly the way that fierce defenders of First
Amendment protections since Meiklejohn have advocated.198 In
particular, we follow Post in emphasizing the importance that
speech regulation can have in securing democratic competence
for the purposes of ensuring that voters see the results of an
election as the legitimate co-authorship of the people.199
In grounding our argument in the democratic interests
underlying the First Amendment, we hope to sketch a path for
regulation of fake news beyond the false campaign speech laws
addressed here. In a modern information environment, a future
Joseph McCarthy will not suppress dissent through direct
censorship of speech,200 but instead by flooding the environment
with false speech to confuse the issue and “troll” armies to
intimidate the speaker. We join Wu in arguing that First
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Amendment law must adapt to this environment to protect the
important interests underlying free speech or risk being rendered
obsolete.201
Democracy loses in the presence of fake news. It loses in
the competence of its elections and in the ability of its people to
see its elections as the result of honest and informed deliberation
of the citizens. To address this loss, we must move beyond the
sloganeering that advocates free speech values only through
unreflective, blanket protection of all political speech. Moreover,
a dogmatic adherence to the Brandeis solution of “more speech”
must confront modern evidence that there is often little reason to
believe that more speech can prevent harms to electoral integrity.
There are, of course, possibilities for abuse in specific
formulations, but we express our value for free speech and robust
public deliberation, not by shrinking from these debates into
dogmatic principles, but by weighing the values carefully and
reaching reasonable regulations.
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